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1.  Introduction 
Ibero-America, just as the rest of the world, faces an increasing urgency to 
transform existing energy systems. In the past, incentives to develop energy systems were 
induced mainly by changes in demand (derived from industrialization and urbanization) 
and by price shocks in fuels. Diversification of energy sources followed a growing need 
of use of particular energy forms. For developing countries, innovating in energy systems 
meant fundamentally gaining control over natural resources and moving away from 
primary, export-oriented enclaves into industrial integration, as well as improving energy 
security. Today, however, environmental constraints and the pressing need to reduce 
energy poverty forge additional challenges and set new directions to change the ways in 
which we use and produce energy. Improving current technologies along the same 
trajectory is simply not enough. Fundamental changes must take place in our economic 
systems in order to combine energy efficiency with low-carbon, sustainable energy 
sources, for which new abilities and solutions need to be targeted. 
This Background Paper reviews the state of energy technology innovation (ETI) 
capabilities in Ibero-America (IA) and examines the barriers and opportunities for 
upgrading and diversifying those capabilities.  We identify four factors that will drive new 
directions in energy technology innovation (ETI). First, the fuel mix of both the regional 
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Institute. and the world demand will continue to change, catalyzing new energy security issues. 
While security needs are more tangible for some energy-importing countries in Ibero-
America (Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Peru), important shifts in demand towards gas and 
processed fuels will be felt all over the region. Relying on new renewable sources can add 
strongly to energy security both in terms of continuous access as well as a buffer for 
price fluctuations. 
Second, expanding access to improved energy services will improve income 
inequality (Latin America is the most unequal region in the world) as well as rural 
conditions and human health. More than a focused, poverty-reducing policy, expansion 
of access to energy is a development policy in its own right with strong impacts in social 
development and economic security. 
Third, developing countries cannot replicate the emission-intensive path of 
industrial economies. In order to avoid dangerous climate disruptions, a new global 
climate framework must be agreed in the next few years. Eventually and inevitably, new 
commitments for developing countries will be required, creating stronger pressure to 
decouple economic growth from green-house gas (GHG) emissions. Latin American 
countries, despite their relatively low emissions profile, are highly vulnerable to climate 
change and will face growing adaptation costs in the near future (de la Torre, et al, 2009; 
see also IPCC, 2007). The region must therefore balance their right to exploit their fossil 
resources for development with the strategic need to manage their own transition to 
sustainable energy. 
Fourth, new energy technologies constitute an emerging wave of generic 
technologies and expanding markets. This “development wave” will offer technological 
and economic benefits for countries that develop suitable entry and catching-up 
strategies, and a missed opportunity for those who don’t.  Moreover, a very large market 
for energy goods and services is anticipated during the 21
st century.  It is not clear 
whether or when Ibero-America will be ready to capture a sizable fraction of this market. 
One recent report indicates that the global market for “diffusion” of carbon mitigation 
technologies will range from approximately $200-$440 billion annually through 2030.   
The market for diffusion of carbon mitigation technologies in developing countries is 
estimated at $80-$260 billion annually (UNFCCC 2009, 24). The International Energy 
Agency estimates there will be a 50 percent increase in world primary energy demand 
between 2005-2030, and that China and India alone account for 45% of the increase.  
Cumulative world investment in energy-supply infrastructure between 2006-2030 could 
be as large as $22 trillion, with China alone accounting for $3.7 trillion of this total (IEA 
2007). 
The first three factors correspond to what we discuss as three principles guiding 
ETI: a) energy security; b) improving human well being; c) enhancing the environmental 
sustainability. These principles complement and compete with each other in rather 
complex ways. The fourth factor highlights an additional principle guiding and facilitating 
ETI, that is, enhancing innovation capabilities for dynamic development. It stresses the 
fact that technological learning is a condition for sustainability in its economic, social, 
and environmental dimensions. 
The focus on capabilities and learning is crucial when considering the nature of 
innovation in general. Innovation is not simply applying new inventions coming from 
scientific labs. It is a complex process, driven by the interaction of different agents within 
given structures, that requires the mobilization of many types of knowledge, skills, and 
resources (Lall, 2000). At the same time, technological innovation is uncertain and 
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decision making. First, outcomes cannot be planned, and each new step (including 
errors) provides new knowledge. Decisions must be sequential, and flexible to change 
course as learning advances. Second, innovations must be used and improved many 
times before they yield benefits. Capital and hardware are thus crucially complemented 
with the accumulation of knowledge and experience (Soete and Arundel, 1990). Even in 
the case of “imitation” processes, innovation decisions contain a considerable degree of 
uncertainty. Finally, cumulativeness also means self-reinforcement of existing trajectories 
and rigidity to depart from established solutions (Arthur, 1988, 1989). 
Uncertainty and cumulativeness play a very strong role in ETI. Energy systems 
are large, complex, and capital-intensive technological systems, with strong resistance to 
change. Energy is used in all economic and social processes, with multiple specific 
applications and specific infrastructures. Durability of assets, high sunken costs, as well 
as high up-front investments make equipment turnover slow. Finally, performance 
criteria, rules and practices, as well as forms of organization (Unruh, 2002), all tend to 
correspond tightly with certain technologies. All these forces bias choices in favor of the 
technological status quo, making the introduction of new energy technologies more 
difficult. That is why energy transitions, in the form of successions of dominant fuels is a 
long-term process that can span for decades, as the infrastructures connecting supply and 
demand are parsimoniously adapted, installed and replaced (Grübler and Nakicenovic, 
1988; Nakicenovic,  Grübler, and McDonald, 1998).  
Current energy systems are “locked-in” into a fossil fuel, carbon-intensive regime 
that is resilient to change. In order to become “competitive”, new ETs must be 
developed in protected niches, discarding unsuccessful variants and improving on the 
best solutions, until they reach the performance and cost levels of incumbent 
technologies. But even then, adaptation costs on the demand side set barriers to 
adoption, especially when demand is fragmented or use depends on exclusive 
infrastructure. Institutional changes such as the setting of standards, interconnection 
contracts, feed-in tariffs and quotas, together with softer financial schemes are then 
necessary for new ET’s to be deployed. 
These features of ETI must be taken into account in order to assess the 
challenges behind four-pronged ETI principles depicted above. A transition towards low 
carbon, diversified renewables sources, that expand access to improved and safe energy 
services will entail a long process of learning and coordinated investments across a range 
of agents and institutions. National strategies must recognize and take advantage of local  
heterogeneity of needs and resources, and aim at balancing short-term efficiency with 
long-term resilience.  
 
2. Energy technology innovation (ETI) and development
1   
Energy-technology innovation (ETI) is the “set of processes leading to new or 
improved energy technologies that can augment energy resources; enhance the quality of 
energy services; and reduce the economic, environmental, or political costs associated 
with energy supply and use” (K.S. Gallagher, Holdren, and Sagar 2006).   Energy-
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implies a more explicit focus on cleaner industrialization, energy-related job creation, and 
the improvement of human and ecological well-being through economic development to 
achieve sustainable prosperity.  Energy innovation systems should be thought of as part 
of “national innovation systems”, though in fact, the important interactions among these 
various systems occur through networks (Nelson 1993). 
For many, if not all, developing countries, there is nearly always a critical choice 
that must be made – whether to make or buy energy technologies.  This “make or buy” 
choice is pervasive in every industry, and not unique to energy technologies.  This 
decision is often made at the firm level, but national governments concerned with 
industrial policy must also decide which strategy to adopt.  Consideration must be given 
to the existing technological capabilities within the firm or sector, the knowledge base, 
the cost of more advanced technologies, the appropriateness of foreign technologies for 
a given country, the ability to assimilate or adapt foreign technologies for local 
conditions, and so forth.   
There is always a danger in assuming that technologies can simply be transferred 
from one context to another, because in practice, it takes considerable skill to imbed a 
new technology into a given system.  Developing countries that decide to “buy” 
technologies from abroad have a range of options for how to do this, including licensing 
technologies, forming joint ventures with firms who own desirable technologies, or 
acquiring foreign firms.   Developing countries will want to consider which types of 
technological capabilities they would like to acquire.  Developing countries that decide to 
try to “make” their own technologies will have to assess their human resource base, and 
how to augment it.  Some try to reverse “brain drains” to industrialized countries by 
luring talented and experienced scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs back to their 
countries.  Others invest in their education system so as to develop a highly skilled 
workforce, or both.  In either case, creation of an industrial policy is often a pre-requisite 
to a successful technology acquisition strategy (Amsden, 2003). 
Energy-technology innovation includes not only research and development 
(R&D), but also demonstration, early deployment (where government often has a special 
role to play), and widespread commercialization.  In practice, these so-called “stages” of 
innovation are not isolated from each other or sequential, but instead overlap and 
include iteration.  When understanding innovation capabilities, however, it is often useful 
to artifically break down innovation into these stages to better assess a country, sector, or 
firm’s capabilities. 
It is difficult to define exactly what is an “energy” technology because so many 
different kinds of technologies underpin the energy system.  Energy technologies are not 
only wind turbines, automotive engines, solar collectors, and deep water oil drills, but 
they are also improved materials and coatings, electronic controls, and computers, and so 
forth, all of which enable improved functioning or efficiency of the production or 
consumption of energy.  The term energy technology refers to the means of locating, 
assessing, harvesting, transporting, processing, and transforming the primary energy 
forms found in nature (e.g., sunlight, biomass, crude petroleum, coal, uranium-bearing 
rocks) to yield either direct energy services (e.g., heat from fuelwood or coal) or 
secondary forms more convenient for human use (e.g., charcoal, gasoline, electricity) 
(Goldemberg 2000). The term also includes the distribution of secondary forms to their 
end users and the means of converting these forms to energy services (e.g., electricity to 
light and refrigeration, electricity and gasoline to motive power).  Technology should also 
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how to develop, adapt, manufacture, and commercialize the relevant piece of hardware. 
Energy technology is important because energy services like heating, cooking, 
and illumination are fundamental human needs and because energy for mining, 
manufacturing, materials processing, construction, transport, communication, 
computing, comfort, and illumination is essential to the functioning of an economy, and 
continued economic development.  Energy expenditures tend to be a large fraction of 
the cost of living and gross domestic product (GDP).  Lower income people tend to pay 
a much higher fraction of income for energy than high income people.  And energy 
technology is important patterns of energy supply and demand can impose high 
environmental, political, and security burdens on societies (K.S. Gallagher et al. 2006). 
Improvements in energy technology are technological changes that result in 
reduced costs, improved efficiency, improved quality, or reductions of environmental or 
political impacts of the provision of an energy service.  Energy-technology innovation 
can reduce the costs of energy technologies we know about today, and also improve the 
menu of options for the future (Holdren 2000).   
ETI over the past century and a half has led to “large improvements in the 
quality of energy services, large reductions in the quantities of primary energy forms 
needed to produce given services, large reductions in the real costs of those services, and, 
in many (but not all) instances, significant reductions in emissions and other 
environmental impacts per unit of service delivered” (K.S. Gallagher et al. 2006, 195).   
As we look towards the old, but persistent, and new challenges before us, energy 
innovation will certainly be a crucial ingredient of the policy solutions.   
The hard questions, therefore, are not about whether or not energy-technology 
innovation is needed or worthwhile, but which types are needed and when, how to make 
it more efficient and effective, how it should be managed, what are the appropriate roles 
of government versus the private or non-governmental sector, to what extent should 
countries cooperate with each other, and how, which inputs are most important and at 
what levels, and what the goals of innovation should be. 
Measurement of energy-technology is very important because private firms wish 
to understand how to maximize the returns of their investments, and governments and 
their publics wish to know how to improve the likelihood that innovation is bettering 
society.  There are numerous ways to measure energy-technology innovation, but 
unfortunately no metric adequately encompasses the processes of innovation, spanning 
basic research to broad commercial deployment. Some metrics capture efforts on basic 
energy R&D, for example, whereas others serve as better indicators of technological 
deployment.  Too often, one indicator (usually, levels of investment) is used to describe 
the performance of an innovation system, when the indicator only describes one aspect 
of innovation.  Still, it is worthwhile to consider the different ways that innovation can be 
assessed through indicators (K.S. Gallagher et al. 2006). 
One can assess technological innovation in general by using quantitative metrics 
and qualitative assessment techniques, and this is true of ETI as well. Quantitative 
metrics include spending or investments for innovation; the number of programs and 
partnerships; the number of technical publications; the number of patents filed, granted, 
and cited; and the use of life-cycle or S-curves; and the calculation of learning rates 
(Gruebler 1998). The diversity of the innovation system, coordination and management 
of technological innovation, and the successes and failures of programs and projects can 
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Quantitative and qualitative measurement tools are highly complementary and should be 
used together to assemble a more complete and accurate picture of ETI.  
Another way to group energy-technology innovation metrics is to classify them in 
three categories: input, output, and outcomes. There are pros and cons for using each of 
these metrics, and each will now be discussed in turn. 
Input metrics are indicative of contributions to the innovation process.  For 
R&D these inputs include financial investments, existing scientific and knowledge (“old 
stock”), and the practical problems and ideas from which new inventions arise. In later 
stages of innovation, inputs include funding for demonstration and deployment 
programs, materials, facilities, and fuels to run demonstration projects, and the developed 
inventions that are moving into the phases of demonstration and deployment. Human 
resources are essential to the inputs because many of the tacit contributions to 
innovation are embedded in people’s minds owing to education, training, and learning 
from past innovative efforts (Nelson 1996, Freeman and Soete 2000, and K.S. Gallagher 
et al. 2006). 
Perhaps the most commonly used input metric of trends in innovation, and for 
energy-technology innovation in particular, are levels of investments (see, for example, 
Dooley 1998, Margolis and Kammen 1999, and K.S. Gallagher and Anadon 2009). 
Although investments are frequently used as an indicator for energy innovation generally, 
this metric is only one of the many inputs to innovation.  An estimate of Latin American 
public and private investments in energy R&D (not including demonstration or 
deployment) are depicted in Table 5.1 and Figures 5.1, and discussed below in section 5. 
If data are available on energy-innovation investments, one can also measure ETI 
intensities (e.g., Brazilian energy R&D spending/GDP), as shown in Figure 5.2. The 
obvious benefit of investment-related metrics is that public spending data tend to be 
more readily available and can be tracked year to year, so that trends can be discerned, 
and regions, countries, and sectors compared (see, for example, Figure 2.1 which depicts 
the U.S. Department of Energy’s investments in RD&D over time (K.S. Gallagher and 
Anadon 2009)). Using investments as a metric is problematic because public investments 
are relatively comprehensive for R&D but not necessarily so for demonstration, and 
even less so for deployment activities. When investment data are inclusive of 
demonstration and deployment, it is frequently impossible to ascertain how they are 
allocated among the different stages. Public investments tend to be collected and 
reported more readily in industrialized countries, but they are less frequently collected 
and reported in developing countries. The IEA collects data for member countries on 
energy RD&D expenditures, but these data do not encompass deployment activities.  
Spending data for the private sector are notoriously poor because private firms 
are not required to report these data, and they often consider them to be proprietary 
information so they are reluctant to share them. Much industrial R&D is conducted by 
diversified corporations, and evaluating the portion of their R&D spending that is 
relevant to energy is difficult as a practical and theoretical matter (Sagar and Holdren 
2002).  
Another frequently used input metric is human resources, including the number 
of scientists and engineers in aggregate, by sector, or on a per capita basis. Data are 
reported in terms of the highest degree attained (e.g., bachelor’s, master’s, doctorate). 
This measure of R&D personnel is useful in a number of ways. The main drawback to 
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not account for the quality or efficiency of the work. Although there may be a large 
number of people engaged in R&D, their output may be poor. Also, when comparing 
the number of people engaged internationally in ETI, one must be especially careful 
because there can be many more people employed in a developing-country setting where 
the cost of labor may be cheap, but the research infrastructure may be much poorer. This 
input metric is difficult in an energy context because it is hard to ascertain when 
scientists and engineers are working purely in the energy domain (K.S. Gallagher et al. 
2006). 
Output metrics are indicators of the results of inputs to the energy-technology 
innovation process.  Frequently-used output metrics include the number of papers 
published in journals, the number of patents filed, granted, or cited, blueprints 
developed, the number of “hard” technologies generated, and the number of process 
innovations, to name a few.  In the energy domain, it is particularly hard to use outcome 
metrics because of how difficult it is to define what is an energy technology.  If you 
cannot define an energy technology, then how can you measure how many related papers 
have been published, patents filed, and so forth?  Thus, available indicators of energy-
technology innovation outputs probably vastly underestimate the true number of energy 
innovation products.   International comparisons of output metrics are risky because the 
propensity to publish in peer-reviewed journals or to patent a new technology varies 
widely among countries.  In addition, many scientific journals are published in English, 
which might make English-speaking nations overrepresented (Archibugi and Coco, 
2005). 
Patents filed, granted, or cited are another metric of innovation in general and 
also for ETI more specifically. As with R&D investments, the main advantage of 
measuring patents is that data tend to be more easy to obtain, at least in industrialized 
countries. It is important to note that patents filed and granted are usually considered to 
be an output indicator of R&D (or invention) activity, not of wider innovative success 
because the invention may never be taken up by the marketplace and commercialized 
(Basberg 1987). The same problem one encounters with respect to defining an energy 
technology when considering which patents are energy related and which are not (and 
when patents filed in a non-energy sector might have implications for the energy sector) 
occurs in the patent realm (K.S. Gallagher et al. 2006).  
Visible, tangible technologies produced are clearly outputs from the innovation 
process.  For R&D managers in private firms, when a technology emerges from the lab 
and becomes embedded in a product, it is clear to management that the inputs to the 
innovation process in terms of financial and human resources were worth it.  Private 
firms are likely to strongly emphasize this metric because technologies that emerge 
through the innovation process and end up being commercialized provide tangible, 
direct benefits to the company. Toyota’s Hybrid Synergy Drive, for example, a set of 
technologies that is being commercially deployed, was the result of concerted innovative 
efforts by the company.  But, this metric is problematic as well because it likely 
underestimates the products of the innovation process.  All of the intangible, tacit 
technologies or improvements in knowledge on the part of the scientists and engineers 
are not counted.  Much such knowledge cannot be codified into blueprints or patents.  
Energy technologies are also usually embedded in technological systems (such as an 
automobile or power plant), and knowledge about how to do the systems integration is 
essential, but hard to quantify.  For many developing countries, the technological know-
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2003; K.S. Gallagher 2006).  
Extending the notion of innovation “outputs”, one can also differentiate energy-
technology innovation outcomes, and their associated metrics.  If output metrics are the 
direct products of the innovation process, outcome metrics measure the results or 
impacts of these innovations.  Outcome metrics “reflect the success of the deployment 
or diffusion of technologies generated in the innovation process” (K.S. Gallagher et al. 
2006, 213).  They can include environmental indicators such as carbon dioxide intensity 
or energy intensity, changes in the energy fuel mix, reductions in costs of different 
technologies or products, and knowledge accumulation.  More qualitative metrics often 
include program or project-based outcomes.  
It is highly tempting to try to quantify the costs and benefits of energy-
technology innovation programs, but as noted by a major U.S. National Research 
Council study on the benefits of U.S. government efficiency and fossil energy R&D 
programs, there are many kinds of energy-related benefits, and many cannot be as easily 
quantified as to their costs (NRC 2001). The NRC notes that benefits of such programs 
can not only be realized as economic benefits of products that enter the marketplace, but 
also as environmental, national security, options (those technologies that have been 
invented that are on the shelf and available for commercialization), or knowledge 
(defined as knowledge resulting from R&D programs that may spill over into other 
sectors or be of use later) benefits. 
With all the focus on global climate change, many have begun to assess GHG 
emissions intensity as an indicator of the success of energy-technology innovation 
projects and programs to reduce GHG emissions.  If greenhouse-gas emissions are 
growing less fast than the economy, the emissions intensity of the economy is improving, 
and therefore cleaner and more efficient technologies must be penetrating the 
marketplace.  Some countries have managed to decouple greenhouse-gas emissions or 
energy use from economic growth, whereas a close relationship between the two can still 
be observed in other countries. 
The number of programs and partnerships in an area of innovation is another 
metric of interest for both governments and private firms, and between public and 
private entities – often termed “public-private partnerships” or PPPs. Of course, one 
could have a large number of very small programs or a small number of very large 
programs and have a similar impact. Nonetheless, one can measure the size of such 
programs and partnerships by the number of employees and investments. The quality of 
programs and partnerships is probably of most interest and can be assessed better 
through qualitative techniques. Still, if a country or corporation has no (or many) 
innovation programs or partnerships in a certain area of importance or interest, this is 
worth noting (K.S. Gallagher et al. 2006).  
Given the availability of data for Ibero-America and scope of this paper, we will 
focus in the following section on R&D investment and innovation outcomes. 
 
3. Energy use in IA countries in context  
3. 1 Energy profiles: fuel mix and dynamics of reserves in Latin America 
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strong presence of hydropower and biomass (Coviello and Altomonte, 2003). Spain and 
Portugal also rely heavily on fossil fuels, with a share of renewables of 6.5% and 17.0% 
respectively (IEA database, 2006). These European countries are net energy importers 
(imports account for 95% and 98% of total primary energy supply in Spain and Portugal 
respectively). As can be seen from figure 3.1, non-biomass energy use in Latin America is 
dominated by oil, with slightly raising shares of hydropower and gas, and a very small 
contribution of coal. The use of renewable energies is pervasive in many LAC’s. 
Countries like Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Paraguay, get most of their energy from renewable sources (mostly biomass and 
hydropower, but also geothermal), with wood accounting for more than 30% of their 
final energy supply (ECLAC, 2003; OLADE; 2006). Larger countries (exc. Brazil) and 
Caribbean Nations depend mainly on fossil fuels, but still with significant shares of 
renewables. In 2006, 25% of final demand in the residential sector was fulfilled with 
wood (OLADE, 2007). 
{INSERT FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE} 
LAC has the highest share of hydropower in the world (Figure 3.2). The potential 
is still much higher: only 22% of estimated hydropower capacity is used (Figure 3.3). See 
also ECLAC (2004, p. 102). 
{INSERT FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE} 
{INSERT FIGURE 3.3 ABOUT HERE} 
As shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, LAC is fairly “secure” in terms of oil 
dependence, but for some countries time is running out on the ability to rely on domestic 
oil supplies for energy use.  Spain and Portugal are entirely oil dependent, with Spain 
consuming more oil than any Latin American country except Brazil and Mexico. 
Table 3.1 exhibits oil dependence in Latin America measured by national oil 
production divided by consumption.  On average, the region produces 1.5 times as much 
oil as it consumes.  Some nations such as Peru however, produce less than is consumed.  
Spain consumes 1,574 thousand barrels of oil per year, and imports all of it.  At that 
level, Spain consumes more oil than all LAC nations except Brazil and Mexico.  Portugal 
consumes 286 thousand barrels of oil per annum, lower than the average in LAC and 
comparable to Colombia. 
{INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE} 
{INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE} 
While it is true that most LAC nations presently enjoy oil surpluses, the future is 
not as bright.  Table 3.2 shows the level of proven reserves in each country, and the 
“reserve to production” (R/P) ratio.  Dividing known proven reserves by the annual 
level of production can give one an estimate of the number of years until the resource 
would be exhausted without new discovery and innovation.  The region has 
approximately 50 years of production left at current rates (not including Brazil’s massive 
new discoveries discussed below).  However, some key producers such as Mexico may 
have only 10 years. 
 
  93.2 Estimates of demand and future investments 
One of the most widely used projections on energy consumption is IEA’s Energy 
Investment Reference Scenario (IEA, 2003), which estimates trends in energy profiles up 
to 2030. The reference scenario for Latin America predicts a transition to an energy 
system based on gas and a rapid expansion of electricity. The total energy investment in 
the region needed to cope up with demand growth would amount to $1.3 trillion USD 
between 2001 and 2030, around 1.5-1.6% of total GDP every year (see Table 3.3). 
Despite its diminishing share in primary energy, oil consumption would grow at an 
annual rate of 1.8% in absolute terms every year, absorbing 1 in every 4 parts of energy 
investment. Almost 30% of all investment would be channeled to oil and gas exploration 
and development. 
{INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE} 
Electricity generation in IEA’s reference scenario would almost double between 
2010 and 2030, from 256 to 492 GW, with gas overtaking hydro as the main power 
source by 2030. The prediction of a strong deployment of gas-fueled electricity is based 
on the current superiority of combined cycle plants, which offer not only a higher 
thermodynamic efficiency but smaller optimal efficient size of plants, increasing 
modularity and flexibility in capacity expansion.
2 According to this scenario, 
hydropower’s share in total capacity would diminish from 54% in 2010 to 41% in 2030. 
The IEA is not optimistic about the diffusion rate of non-hydro renewable electricity, 
which is projected to grow from 2.3 to 3.9% of total generation capacity between 2010 
and 2030 (to be equivalent to coal). Without major deployment of CCS technologies, 
IEA’s reference scenario is clearly at odds with mitigation schedules that advocate for 
developing countries to curb energy GHG emissions by 2020 (cfr. Baer, Athanasiou and 
Kartha, 2007). 
{INSERT FIGURE 3.4 ABOUT HERE} 
3.3 Energy-related and other GHG emissions  
LA contributes with a small share of total GHG, although there is a strong 
heterogeneity in Per capita CO2 emissions across countries. Energy-related emissions are 
relatively low with respect to the rest of the developing world, due to the extended use of 
hydropower and the low share of carbon. CO2 emissions per unit of produced energy in 
LA’s electricity sector is 40% smaller than the world average, and 74% smaller than in 
China and India (de la Torre, et al, p. 22). Land use change, on the contrary, is the main 
source of GHG emissions in the LA region, constituting 46% of total emissions (above 
the world average of 17%). This later factor raises serious concerns on the emissions 
impact of biomass as energy, and stresses the importance of environmental management 
of energy producing plantations.
3
While LACs emissions are low compared to those of Spain and Portugal, the emissions’ 
path as per capita augments is more intensive (Figure 3.10), mainly due to the fact that 
                                                 
2 IEA’s Report calculates investment costs for electricity capacity (in general) to fall at a rate of 1.2 per cent 
a year between 2010 and 2030; investment costs for renewables (both hydro and non-hydro) are on the 
projected to diminish more slowly, at -0.40% a year. 
3 The share of wood and unsustainable biomass in total primary energy is high in Guatemala (59%), El 
Salvador (37%), Honduras (69%), Nicaragua (50%), and Haiti (73%). In Brazil, biomass represents up to 
22% of the total energy supply (ECLAC, 2003; OLADE, 2006). 
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use per level of income (see Figure 3.11). This would mean that, despite the strong share 
of low-carbon energy sources, a stronger effort to disengage emissions from economic 
growth would be needed in the region in order to compensate for the highly emissions-
intensive energy exporting sector. 
{INSERT FIGURE 3.5 ABOUT HERE} 
{INSERT FIGURE 3.6 ABOUT HERE} 
3.4 Biomass, deforestation, equity and energy access 
The use of traditional biomass as energy fuel is widespread in Latin America (see 
Coviello and Altomonte, 2003), where firewood is the dominant fuel of low-income 
households. The use of traditional fuels, in other words, reflects the large socio-
economic inequalities that plague the region. For a handful of countries, the percentage 
of population that lack access to electricity still remains in the range of 20-30% (Haiti, 
Honduras, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru, Guyana, Grenada, Panama and Guatemala). Almeida 
and De Oliveira (1995) showed clearly how firewood use is gradually replaced by liquid 
fuels and electricity as the level of income increases in Brazilian households. While per 
capita use of firewood in Latin America would have decreased between 1961 and 2006 
from 0.77 to 0.50 cubic meters per person, the volume of firewood in the region 
increased 65% in the same period, contributing in a very important way to deforestation. 
But lack of access to modern energy sources means much more than a different fuel mix. 
While fossil fuel consumption carries its own problems, solid fuels for cooking and 
heating also produce significant health and environmental impacts, and is associated with 
increased morbidity and premature death particularly because of incomplete combustion 
(Goldemberg and Johansson, 2004, p. 40). However, the use of biomass can become a 
sustainable option to liquid and other fuel sources when improved efficiency biomass is 
combined with forestry management and other sustainable energy sources (Nabuurs, et 
al., 2007; Massera et al, 2005)). Developing new sustainable energy futures for the rural 
areas and small towns means in this respect enormous challenges and opportunities for 
ETI in the region, and a necessary step for reducing both inequality and environmental 
impact. 
4. The ETI System in Ibero-America  
Oil, gas, and electricity sectors in Latin America are dominated by large 
companies, most of them state-owned, or by combinations of public and private 
oligopolies. Energy firms are among the largest firms in Latin America.
4 At the same 
time, rents from energy resources are a very important source of fiscal revenues in oil 
and gas exporting nations of the region, a factor that shapes strongly the autonomy and 
strategic direction of the sector. Although investment decisions tend to be more 
concentrated than in developed countries like Canada and the USA (see Moscardella and 
Hyott, 1998), the privatization and deregulation processes of the 1990’s increased the 
participation of private agents, mainly in the form of independent energy producers. 
                                                 
4 Pemex, PDVSA, Petrobras and Mexico’s CFE are the top 4 largest firms in Latin America’s Top 500 
Firms (Latin Trade, 2009). Other energy firm situated among  the top 100 largest firms in the region are 
Ipiranga Conglomerate (Brazil), Electrobras (Brazil), Repsol YPF (Argentina), Copec (Chile), EcoPetrol 
(Colombia), ENAP (Chile), Shell (Brazil), Petroecuador (Ecuador), Chevron (Brazil), Esso Brasileira, AES 
Elpa, Eletropaulo, and Cemig (Brazil), Petrobras Argentina,  
  11Most state-owned energy companies developed R&D facilities for acquiring 
critical technological capabilities during the 1960’s and 1970’s (IMP and IIE in Mexico, 
Intdev in Venezuela, CENPES in Brazil; see section 5). These public institutions up-
graded the knowledge and capability bases needed for scaling-up energy production, 
distribution and transmission to industrial levels. However, just as with most industrial 
sectors in the LA region, energy innovation systems remain strongly dependent on 
foreign technology sources, namely the multinational firms in the oil, gas and electricity 
industries. The extent to which local firms carry on R&D is generally limited to 
technology transfer assessment, maintenance, and skill personnel training (see ECLAC, 
2008 for the case of R&D in general in LA). However, many local R&D labs and firms 
have developed product and processes innovations, especially in the oil and electricity 
sectors. 
The extent to which Latin American large energy companies can drive alone the 
necessary innovation impulse for an energy transition is questionable, and must be 
carefully assessed for each country strategy. As industrial incumbents, these firms will 
expectedly reinforce, rather than weaken the current technological regime, because of 
their rigidity to switch to a different technological base. Competencies also tend “lock in” 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). When the resources pushing the transition are alien to the 
incumbents, new comer entities must be set in place to foster change (Smith, Stirling and 
Berhout, 2005). However in some cases, like Petrobras’ development of biofuels, these 
large incumbents are likely to push innovation in complementary technologies. 
The local base of suppliers of manufacturing and capital equipment to the energy 
industries has been traditionally narrow (some notorious exceptions are oil pipes and oil-
gas duct infrastructure in Mexico and Argentina through TAMSA and TERNIUM, and 
capital equipment in Brazil). A more or less defined division of labor tends to exist 
between local and foreign firms tends to exist in energy projects in general, with the first 
providing basic and civil engineering, while the latter carry on plant design and detail 
engineering (see Moscardella and Hyott, 1998, for the case of Mexico). 
By means of extrapolation, one can plausibly expect that Energy Innovation 
Systems in Latin America replicate many of the features of National Innovation Systems 
described by ECLAC’s Study on Productivity (ECLAC, 2008): a) they exhibit low R&D 
intensities (measure as R&D investment over gross domestic product; b) dominant share 
of capital expenditure in R&D expenditure; c) small share of private investment in total 
R&D; d) most R&D concentrated in large firms; e) absence of venture capital and other 
mechanisms for supporting private R&D investment; f) in patents, very low local 
patenting, (see figure 4.1), most patenting concentrated in independent inventors not if 
firms. Many of these features are identified and qualified in section 5. 
{INSERT FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE} 
Outsourcing of technological services has been growing hand-in-hand with the 
diffusion of new models for financing energy projects. According to a recent study by 
the Cambridge Energy Research Associates, this is precisely the trend in the U.S. oil and 
gas industries.
5 This new investment schemes became frequent in the LA region after the 
collapse of financial models based on state-debt (Islas and Rodríguez, 1997). 
Outsourcing can have ambiguous effects on local technological capabilities: while on one 
side it allows energy firms to stay up-to-date with technological solutions, on the other 
                                                 
5 Journal of Petroleum Technology, “Industry Updates”, 12 January 2009. 
  12hand it reduces their absorptive capability, preventing learning. In the worst cases, it can 
substitute for  local existing capabilities and accelerate their depreciation (as is the case of 
turn-key plant projects). 
 
5. ETI Capabilities in Ibero-America  
5.1 ETI RD&D efforts in IA 
As noted in the introduction, R&D investment is not sufficient for ETI in any 
sense. It is, however, a crucially necessary input. R&D is the main source of 
technological knowledge and a the central mechanism for revealing and specifying 
technological opportunities (Nelson, 2001).  Research provides crucial functions with no 
close substitutes, by generating knowledge and understanding, training of personnel in 
problem solving activities, mapping of resources, problems, and solutions.   
Development, in turn, provides the link between knowledge and workable solutions and 
is the first step to applicability, concentrating the bulk of R&D investment (up to 67%) 
in developed countries (Rosenberg, 1994, p. 13). 
Contrary to the late-comer advantage thesis (Krueger, 1991), countries that 
develop later cannot usually skip the stages of and costs of technological development. 
There are of course many important, non-technical barriers to technology transfer, 
including market and income size, entry barriers and strategies to control and manage 
technological assets, as well as asymmetries in the technology market (Kumar, 1998; 
Dunning, 1988; Katz, 1976; Vaitsos, 1970).  But it is also clear that local efforts in search 
and development activities are crucial factors for international technology transfer 
(Mowery and Oxley, 1995). In order to exploit imported technologies firms must 
develop “absorptive capacity”, i.e. the capabilities to understand and apply those 
technologies internally (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  Technological “leapfrogging” is 
possible, and the most famous case of this in the energy domain is Brazilian sugarcane 
ethanol (Goldemberg 1998).  But, technological leapfrogging is far from automatic and 
limits to leapfrogging have also been observed.  The absence of aligned domestic policy 
incentives is a key barrier for leapfrogging (K.S. Gallagher 2006).  These capabilities are 
needed even for making correct choices for purchasing new technologies. It is also 
necessary to unpack tacit components of technology, both to explore new applications 
and ways to exploit them according to local needs, as well as for specifying opportunities 
for further advance. Internal R&D is for these reasons not a substitute, but a 
complement to contracting of external R&D (Mowery, 1983).  
Public support in Energy R&D (ER&D) is necessary for many well known and 
accepted reasons. The argument, which refers to public investment in basic R&D was 
formulated by R. Nelson in 1959, and even earlier in the United States by Vannevar 
Bush: basic research provides many solutions to different problems and can produce 
higher social benefits than private benefits. Left to private decisions, the economy would 
invest fewer resources than socially beneficial (Nelson, 1959).  Indeed, because the 
returns from basic research are so uncertain but also so potentially beneficial to society, 
only the government can be expected to support basic research, though at times large 
companies have been willing to also make such investments (e.g. Bell Labs).  The private 
sector appears to have become more myopic over time, investing in increasingly applied 
research to chase short-term profits.  The argument applies as well to applied R&D, even 
though the boundaries between one and the other tends to become more and more 
blurred with time. This does not mean of course that private firms do not find incentives 
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on “applied” R&D, many times firms find it profitable to invest in basic knowledge. In 
the case of Energy R&D, there are even stronger incentives for public investment to go 
beyond research into development and even initial deployment: energy innovations face 
very large upfront costs and lab-to-plant upgrading costs. Additionally, as noted before, 
energy R&D provides very large social and strategic benefits. 
Despite the pressing needs to find alternatives to fossil energy and improve 
energy efficiency, public ER&D in the developed world has decreased systematically 
since the late 1970’s everywhere except in Japan (Kammen and Nemet, 2007; K.S. 
Gallagher and Anadon, 2009; Margolis and Kammen, 2009). And yet, R&D expenditure 
in LA is relatively low compared with international standards (see ECLAC, 2008; OECD, 
2008). 
The R&D profiles of the LA region tend to be concentrated in research rather 
than development, and to be state funded, which reflects very low private-firm 
engagement in active innovation activities. In turn, this reflect to a large extent the 
pattern of economic specialization of LA in lower-intensive manufacturing branches. 
Together with low patenting, and weak presence of innovative firms in every sector, 
R&D expenditure tend to be mostly investment in embodied technology, reflecting a 
very weak allocation effort to design, engineering, and other development activities 
(ECLAC, 2008). 
Energy R&D (ER&D) investment data for LA countries is very scarce and 
scattered in time. Availability of data differs greatly by country and time-period. The 
database we constructed is obviously incomplete, and probably biased against certain 
countries (with the most notorious absence of the B. R. of Venezuela). As we explain in 
Table 5.1, we elaborated on existing data an updated image of the level of Energy R&D 
investment in the region. 
{INSERT TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE} 
In absolute terms, ER&D in Iberoamerica is concentrated in three countries: 
Brazil, Spain and Mexico (see table 5.1), which account for 95% of total ER&D in the 
region for the period 2000-2005. Argentina, Chile and Portugal come in a second group 
(we lack information for Chile after 2001). 
In relative terms, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay, show high 
shares of energy in total R&D, slightly higher than the ratio in the US (see figure 5.1). 
However, lack of information may induce biases in countries with few data points (e. g. 
Panama). 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE} 
Regarding the time pattern, we show that there is slight diminishing trend 
between the 1990’s and the period 2000-2006, both in the time series (figure 5.2) as when 
comparing cumulative investment in these periods. Brazil is the big exception to the 
regional trend, with both public and private R&D growing in tandem. In the case of 
Spain, evidence on a diminishing trend is more solid, since the series that goes back to 
1975. Public ER&D in Spain has been clearly diminishing all the way after 1982. 
However, ER&D investments made by Spanish firms increased boldly after 2000. The 
shift in relative weights between public and private R&D would reflect a process of 
national development of the knowledge base where initial public investment set the 
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that happened in Korean manufacturing industries, cfr. Kim, 1990) 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE} 
There are some important caveats about these figures on ER&D data. The most 
important one is that ER&D is aggregated, making it impossible to distinguish by energy 
source or even by industry within the energy sector. Secondly, ER&D tells us nothing 
about the nature of capabilities being developed. For example, these investments may 
very likely include exploration and development in conventional oil and gas resources 
(particularly, this is be the case of an important share of the accounted R&D in Mexico 
and Uruguay). Even more, it is not impossible to know if ER&D is an indicator of 
knowledge and technological development within an existing technological trajectory of 
oil production, or is actually devoted to develop new technologies for fossil energy (off-
shore, deep-drilling, etc.) or to renewables. Third, we cannot specify if ER&D 
investment is carried on in-house (that is, within the firm) or outsourced (carried out by 
other firms within or without the country). In this latter sense, ER&D expenditures 
would be reflecting R&D effort but overestimating at the same time the accumulation of 
local capabilities. Again, external R&D is not a substitute of local R&D, or viceversa. 
As noted above, R&D is necessary but not at all sufficient for ETI. Moreover, it 
is not sufficient for an ETI guided by the four principles proposed in the Introduction. 
First, only by developing skills and competencies in downstream activities like 
production, distribution and marketing can economic returns from local innovation be 
appropriated. Second, R&D can take place within the existing technological regimes 
(Kemp and Rotmans, 1999), actually reinforces existing technologies. More information 
is needed to assess the direction of R&D, a task towards which we turn in the following 
section. 
 
 5.2 Deployment of New Renewable Electricity Sources (RES) 
In aggregated terms, LACs have a relatively strong foothold in New Renewable 
Electricity Sources (NRES) for Electricity Generation, particularly biomass and 
geothermal. One of the most comprehensive studies on Renewable Energy Sources in 
the Region (ECLAC, 2004) shows that the region has been gaining experience in a wide 
range of programs, institutions, and promotion policies for thermo-solar modules, 
photovoltaic systems, wind energy, biofuels and biomass, and renewable rural 
electrification. However, and with notable exceptions, these technologies have not been 
able to articulate the critical mass of resources, capabilities and enabling policies needed 
to deploy them beyond isolated niches of application. This fact is reflected in the 
negligible trace that these technologies leave at aggregated levels of energy use. 
Nonetheless, the LA region exhibits a relatively high degree of penetration of NRES. 
In terms of the penetration of NRES in electricity production, LA is second only 
after Europe (Figure 5.3). This is relevant considering the region’s abundance of fossil 
energy, a factor with a strong impact in other oil and gas rich regions like Eurasia and the 
Middle East. The early deployment of geothermal and biomass electricity of these two 
sources (the first in Mexico and the second in Brazil) made the region a leader (in relative 
terms) on new renewable electricity since late 1970’s to mid 1980’s. However, since 1987 
and up until 2000 the share of NRES in LA stagnated around 2% of total electricity 
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almost 3%. 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.3 ABOUT HERE} 
However, both in absolute terms as in terms relative to population, the regions’ 
NRES production is much less spectacular and much smaller compared to that of the US 
and Europe (Figure 5.4). Moreover, it seems like LACs have specialized in technologies 
with very slow pace of development and deployment (geothermal and biomass), while 
seems to be unable to develop the newer electricity sources with much stronger growth 
potential, notably wind energy, solar and fuel cells (see Table 5.2 and Figures 5.5 to 5.8). 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.4 ABOUT HERE} 
{INSERT TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE} 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.5 ABOUT HERE} 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.6 ABOUT HERE} 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.7 ABOUT HERE} 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.8 ABOUT HERE} 
 
5.3 Illustrative examples of innovation outcomes in IA 
This section highlights Brazil and Spain as ETI capability success stories and 
briefly juxtaposes these examples with the more limited case of Mexico.  In the Brazilian 
case we focus on oil exploration and the development of biofuels.  For Spain we discuss 
the development and deployment of wind energy.  Mexico has attempted to build 
capabilities in both oil exploration and in wind but with much more limited results.  The 
successes in Brazil in Spain are very different in nature, but three traits stand out:  a long-
run commitment on the part of the state to build capabilities, accessing technology and 
know-how from foreign firms, and government guarantees of price and market stability 
for energy suppliers. 
5.3.1.  Brazil: Turning Crisis into Opportunity 
As the world considers options in the midst of the current financial crisis we 
would do well to look back at how Brazil turned its economic and energy crises of the 
early 70s into an opportunity to develop world class domestic oil and ethanol production 
capabilities.  Brazil was hit hard by the oil shock of the early 1970s, and found itself with 
a shortage of foreign exchange.  In response to the crisis Brazil embarked on a two 
pronged energy innovation strategy:  invest in building technological capabilities for oil 
prospecting in deep waters, the fruits of which could be the cornerstone of a domestic 
production base; and to develop alternative energy sources.  
  The chief orchestrator of Brazil’s energy innovation strategy is the country’s 
state-owned energy company, Petrobras.  Before the oil shock of the early 1970s Brazil 
was importing 80 percent of its petroleum and sugar prices simultaneously collapsed.  
Though the company was founded in 1954, it still maintained very sparse deep water 
drilling or ethanol capabilities in 1974.  By 2009 Brazil’s Petrobras ranked sixth among 
the world’s largest oil companies and Brazil is now the second largest ethanol producer 
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fairly rapid fashion through the strong and guiding hand of the state, learning effects 
from other types of industry in Brazil, and maintaining “embedded autonomy” (or 
partnering but maintaining authority) with the private sector. 
Exploration 
In the past few years, Petrobras has overseen the discovery of numerous oil 
deposits in ultra deep water.  The crest of these discoveries was a 2007 discovery of what 
could turn out to be 5-8 billion barrels of oil and natural gas.  The first oil drawn from 
the Tupi Fields of the Santos Basin off the coast of Rio de Janeiro where the oil and gas 
was discovered, occurred in May of 2009.  Brazil says that these discoveries are the tip of 
the iceberg.  They continue to make discoveries in the nearby Campos Basin, and the 
Santos Basin where the Tupi Fields were discovered have hardly been explored. 
Thirty-five years is a long time for a government to think ahead, but that’s just 
what Brazil did in the early 1970s.  Indeed, it was a gamble, but one that paid off.  Their 
two pronged strategy has made Brazil all but energy independent.  If these latest oil 
discoveries bear fruit, Brazil will also be one of the largest exporters in the world.  What 
exactly did Brazil do? 
  The antecedents of Brazil’s oil exploration capability are in Brazil’s larger 
industrialization strategy that started in the 1950s, Brazil did not decide to carry this 
strategy over to the energy sector until the crisis of the early 1970s.  According to Surrey 
(1987), four factors assisted the development of Brazil’s petroleum sector: 
 
•  The (relatively) rapid industrialization and the development of steel and 
shipbuilding, as well as civil and mechanical engineering; 
•  Oil import substitution which allowed domestic firms to establish in new 
domestic markets, alongside the careful selection and screening of FDI with 
specific technological capabilities; 
•  The ability to attract foreign firms to work in Brazil, especially alongside 
domestic firms; and 
•  The role Petrobras played in assisting national firms, such as vetting the technical 
expertise of firms, putting Petrobras staff in place to monitor contract quality, 
setting up an award system for domestic innovation, and R&D assistance 
through its dynamic R&D centre, CENPES.  Indeed, Petrobras is ranked 5
th in 
the world in terms of oil R&D and is the leading innovative firm in Brazil, having 
spent the largest amount of funds on R&D and is also the leading patent holder 
(Carvalho and Goldstein, 2008). 
These factors helped jump start Brazil’s efforts, and by 1977 Brazil discovered deep 
water deposits in the Campos Basin off the coast of Rio de Janeiro.  Upon this discovery, 
for over thirty years since Petrobras has developed strategy for Campos Basin and now 
the nearby Santos Basin to proximate domestic firms alongside multinationals, university 
research centres, and government agencies to enhance agglomeration effects and build 
capacity over time.  Table 5.2 exhibits the network of these firms, suppliers, and other 
entities in the Campos Basin region.  Key to the success has been Petrobras’ ability to act 
as the ‘governor’ of the complex mix of state and private actors from home and abroad 
(Silvestre and Tavares, 2009). 
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Biofuels 
In tandem with efforts to build domestic oil capabilities Brazil also sought to 
develop alternative sources of energy other than oil.  Their breakthrough in this area, also 
orchestrated by Petrobras, is sugarcane based ethanol.  In November of 1975 Brazil 
started its National Alcohol Program (Proalcool).  After thirty years, Brazil now 
substitutes ethanol for 20 percent of automotive fuel and 80 percent of Brazilian cars can 
run on blends of gasoline and ethanol.    
  Under Proalcool, Brazil set up the National Alcohol Commission (CNAL) was 
established to a favorable credit environment, guarantee a market for all the alcohol 
produced, and to stimulate production.  In this environment, the following policies were 
designed by the government and have guided the development of the sector for thirty 
years  (see Hira and Oliveira, 2009; BNDES and CGEE, 2008):  
•  Stipulate that Petrobras purchases a guaranteed amount of ethanol on an annual 
basis; 
•  That the Bank of Brazil provide low-interest loans to ethanol distilleries; 
•  Requiring the availability of ethanol at gas stations; 
•  Subsidize and regulate prices to stimulate consumer demand; 
•  Maintaining strategic reserves to stabilize supply; 
•  Support a Research and Development network 
As mentioned earlier, Brazil’s ethanol industry is the second largest in the world (to 
the US) and now employs 1 million workers (BNDES, CGEE, 2008).  As in the case of 
oil exploration (see Table 5.2), the majority of effort and innovation in this sector has 
occurred in a geographically specific region with agglomeration effects.  In the case of 
ethanol, Sao Paulo serves as the hub of activity given its approximation to the bulk of 
sugar production and a large portion of consumer demand in Brazil.  R&D efforts range 
from genetics research and improving sugarcane breeding, to focusing on new varieties, 
pest control, milling capacity, and so forth.  As a result of such efforts by the IAC and 
CTC (see Table, NUMBER?), average sugarcane yields in Brazil have increased from 
3900 ha/annum in the early 1980s to 5600 in 2001 (Hira and de Oliveria, 2009). 
  The biggest breakthrough for Brazil came in 2003 when the Brazilian car industry 
developed flex-fuel vehicles and the run-up of global oil prices that occurred at about the 
same time.  By early 2005, sale of flex-fuel cars outstripped sales of gasoline powered cars 
and accounted for 57 percent of all sales that year.  By 2009, flex-fuel cars were close to 
21% of Brazil's car fleet and ethanol now represents 16.7% of the country's total energy 
consumption by the automotive sector.  
Finally, Brazil is the country in the region with the largest set of university-based 
centers for developing New Renewable Energies.
6  The amount and quality of linkages 
                                                 
6  The list of center includes: CBEE - Brazilian Center for Wind Energy at the Federal University of 
Pernambuco; CENBIO - National Reference Center for Biomass at the University of São Paulo; CENEH 
- National Reference Center for Hydrogen at the University of Campinas; CERPCH - Reference Center 
for Small Hydropower at the Itajubá Federal Engineering School; CRESESB - Reference Center for Solar 
and Wind Energy at the Electric Energy Research Center, CEPEL;  GREEN SOLAR - Brazilian Center 
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to take advantage of this knowledge base will determine to a good extent the future 
innovation potential of Brazil in these areas.  
Essential Role of Long-Run Financing 
  One of the key lessons from the Brazilian experience and pertaining to 
innovation in general is the need for a long-run commitment and sustained and below 
market financing for energy technology innovation.  Since 1952 Brazil’s National 
Development Bank, BNDES has been a pioneer in terms of energy and ETI financing.  
BNDES played a key role in kick-starting both the oil and biofuels industries in Brazil, 
and continues to support efforts in energy deployment and innovation. 
  BNDES has emerged as the largest development bank in LAC, larger than the 
Inter-American Development Bank.  BNDES assets in 2008 were approximately $150 
billion ($277 Real), while the IDB holds $69 billion. Interestingly BNDES’s funds come 
from Brazil’s labor ministry, so the end goal of all industrialization and energy programs 
through BNDES is employment creation. BNDES supports a variety of activities 
through loans, equity stakes, and grants. Some of these policies derive from BNDES 
initiative, but for the most part the push comes from Brazil’s larger industrial policy, 
called the “Productive Development Policy” (PDP). BNDES serves a member of PDP’S 
executive secretary and plays the financing role of the PDP’s implementation strategy. 
The strategic industries under Brazil’s current industrial policy are energy, 
pharmaceuticals, software, among others.  As shown in Table 5.4, currently, BNDES 
finances fixed investments throughout the energy production chain, for the reduction of 
waste in the sector, and for innovation activities. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 5.4 ABOUT HERE} 
  Energy development and innovation activities reached $16, 570 in 2008 
(approximately $ 8.2 billion US) and only slightly tapered off in 2009 in the wage of the 
crisis.  This shows the commitment on the part of the government and BNDES to 
sustain financing throughout political and economic changes.  For loan activities 
BNDES interest rates hover at 6.25 percent (basically covering transaction costs only).  
This is far below the 9 or more percent for similar loans in the private market since 2000.   
  Innovation in general is a cornerstone of the PDP and BNDES starting playing a 
role in such activities in 2006.  Innovation loans support private firms to develop the 
capabilities to engage in ongoing innovative activities. Special emphasis focuses on 
technology projects aiming at the development of new or significantly improved 
products and/or processes. 
 
BNDES also operates an innovation grant program, the Technology Fund 
(FUNTEC). The grants support research, development and innovation projects in the 
strategic industries under PDP. To be eligible, a project must be headed by a university 
or technological institute in cooperation with a private company.  Energy is one of 
                                                                                                                                            
for the Development of Thermo-Solar Energy at the Catholic University of Minas Gerais, PUC-MG; 
CERBIO - Reference Center for Biofuels at Paraná Institute of Technology, TECPAR; NAPER - Support 
Center for Renewable Energy Projects at the Federal University of Pernambuco, UFPE; GEDAE - 
Development of Alternative Energies Studies Group at the Federal University of Pará, UFPA (Source: 
ECLAC, 2004) 
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biodiesel, energy forest and new environmentally friendly processes) and hydroelectricity. 
As Table 5.4 shows, funding for this program was initially small but has grown 




5.3.2: Spain:  Avoiding Crises and Making Opportunities 
  Whereas Brazil is a more comprehensive success with two cases of building 
capabilities from scratch and bringing them to fruition through the deployment and 
diffusion phases to become a globally competitive leader, Spain’s success lies in its 
relatively recent ability to access foreign technologies, and absorb such capabilities to the 
extent that a vibrant domestic sector has begun to make inroads into global markets, 
such as Mexico.   
  Spain enacted an official policy to diversify its energy base after the second oil 
shock of the early 1980s.  These policies continued but were reinvigorated in response to 
the diffusion of knowledge related to the climate crisis during the late 1990s.  In 2009, 
eleven percent of Spain’s energy came from wind sources.  In 1995 wind was relatively 
non-existent (del Rio Gonzalez, 2009).   
{INSERT FIGURE 5.9 ABOUT HERE} 
Spain’s 1980 entry into the renewable energy industry came in the form of public 
R&D, subsidies to local firms, and a “feed-in” tariff.  Spain embarked on research and 
development on windmill technology, connectivity to grid issues and so forth. In terms 
of subsidies, Spain’s utility would provide 50-90 percent of the investment costs.   
However, the feed-in tariff (a guarantee of energy purchase) was subject to change each 
year and thus seen as highly risky (Dinica, 2008).  Deployment received a second wind in 
1997 when the policy was modified in response to renewed concerns about energy 
dependence and new concerns about the natural environment, particularly climate 
change. 
  By 2005 Spain was second in the world in total installed wind power capacity 
(over 10,000 MW) and wind comprised 11 percent of all of Spain’s energy demand. The 
two factors that led to the rapid deployment and diffusion of wind technology in Spain 
have been the nation’s evolving “feed-in laws,” the development by foreign firms linked 
with domestic firms and the engineering knowledge and resources available from Spanish 
utility companies.   Feed-in laws are provisions that guarantee producers a fixed price 
above market prices for a number of years (referred to as the “feed in tariff” and/or a 
premium scheme that is also guaranteed for a set number of years.  Spain’s law also 
guarantees grid access for renewables. (Munoz et al, 2007).   
  Spain also acquired, deployed, diffused, and established backward linkages with 
foreign wind technologies.  According to Stenzel and Frenzel (2008), the most illustrative 
example of the development of wind capabilities in Spain is the case of Iberdrola, a large 
utility in Spain.  In 1994 one of the company’s subsidiaries was to plan and install six 
wind farms.  Another subsidiary of the company, Gamesa, was a firm with a long history 
of engineering and design capabilities through its experience in the manufacture of 
aeronautical and automobile components.  Gamesa obtained a licensing agreement with 
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Vestas’ 500 kW turbines.  Yet another subsidiary conducted engineering and services for 
installation and grid connections, thus enabling Iberdrola in one way or another to be 
involved in all aspects of the value chain.  This model and similar partnerships became 
the rule for Spanish wind deployment (Dinica, 2008) 
 
5.3.3 Mexico: one step forward, two steps backwards 
Mexico is a major oil exporter and its largest firm, Pemex, is the largest energy producing 
firm in the region.
7 The CFE, the public Electricity Facility is also among the largest and 
most efficient companies in the region. Both energy giants have devoted a great deal of 
effort to optimizing generation and extraction processes, and are mostly users of up to 
date technology. However, the Mexican energy innovation system is small, with a highly 
discontinuous level of innovative activity, weak internal relationships between and 
among universities, industry and government, and subjected to unstable programs and 
resource flows. The system works in general for guaranteeing operational tasks and 
securing external technology flows, sometimes at the expense of deepening local 
capabilities (Cimoli, 2000). 
 
Oil exploration, development, and refining 
Pemex’s R&D institution, the Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo (IMP) was created 
in 1965, with the objective of augmenting local “technological autonomy for managing 
resources and technology, intensifying oil exploration, increasing the capacity for deep-
drilling and satisfying growing local demand, by means of scientific and engineering 
programs that were up to date provided to Pemex by international firms” (Guajardo, 
2007, p. 141). The IMP made possible the height of oil production in Mexico during the 
1970’s and 1980’s, becoming rapidly one of the most important R&D centers in the 
Third World. 
In its beginnings, Pemex transferred to the IMP its geology projects, and required 
from it solutions for secondary retrieval, as well as studies for valuing oils and improving 
performance. In a second phase, the IMP was assigned to the task of substituting 
imports by developing catalyzers for refining oil and petrochemicals, material research, as 
well as establishing quality controls and a system of productive linkages to the capital 
good industry, aiming at the maximal participation of local producers of materials, 
equipment, and instruments (Wionczek, Bueno and Navarrete, 1988; see also Aboites, et 
al. ). 
In its first ten years the IMP augmented and diversified its operations and 
projects, substituting successfully a range of engineering and R&D services previously 
contracted by Pemex to international firms. By 1972 the patent assets numbered 42 and 
its services extended to the private sector. By 1973, thanks to the production of the IMP, 
Pemex integrated the production of polyester fibers and increased plant scale and 
complexity in petrochemical and refining plants. With the oil boom of 1977-1981, the 
IMP increased strongly its technological assets, allowing Pemex to become a world leader 
in oil reserves and production, “mastering the sequence of technological development 
                                                 
7 In terms of assets, the four subsidiaries of Pemex worth $84.1 US billions in 2004; Petrobras was $19.4 
and PDVSA $13.4 (World Bank, 2006; see Aykut and Goldstein, 2006) 
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construction projects” (Guajardo, p. 144). By 1976, 90% of all detail engineering of 
Pemex’ projects was developed in Mexico. 
Pemex’ contracting practices were based on direct allocation of projects to IMP 
and other local engineering and construction firms. IMP and Pemex relations changed 
drastically after the 1982 crisis and the reorientation of the economic model. Budgetary 
restrictions forced to switch from direct allocation to project contracting as services. 
From 1986 on the IMP started to sell projects to Pemex, instead of receiving fixed 
monthly resources (Guajardo, p. 145). The institute was slowly shifted to a position were 
it had to search for economic profits as just another supplier to Pemex. However, due to 
its legal and political constituency and frameworks, it could not freely commercialize its 
products. Its entrepreneurial activities were blocked politically and legally. By 1985, with 
a deepening crisis, a whole range of project were cancelled, as well as the acquisition of 
equipment, materials and personnel. Serious cutbacks were exerted on personnel in 
engineering and seismologic services, services to refineries, petrochemical plants and 
catalizers. Between 1996 and 2001, the number of projects by Pemex Exploración y 
Producción carried on in tandem with the IMP fell from 62 (of a total of 66) to 14 (of a 
total of 64) (Pemex, 2002) 
This situation also shifted IMP from R&D into servicing Pemex’ immediate 
operative needs. R&D orientation and criteria suffered a lack of political clarity and mis-
information on the part of PEMEX directives. After 1992, when Pemex’ subsisdiaries 
were separated, the IMP could no more work on pre-defined contracts but instead had 
to compete for them in the international market. Moreover, the subsidiaries scheme of 
subcontracting and proliferation of “turn-key plant” projects implied that Pemex ceased 
to be neither “a captive nor a secure market for the IMP”(Guajardo, p. 151). The reform 
created a Pemex that exported more, refined less, abandoned production of 
petrochemicals, reduced processing of gas, and started flaring gas at higher rates than 
before. 
As a result of the deterioration of IMP’s capabilities, Pemex’s technological and 
knowledge bases also receded back. A qualitative assessment of Pemex Exploration and 
Production Division, carried on between 1996 and 2000 over 267 technologies showed 
that Pemex’ capability base is in general falling behind the frontier. In consequence, the 
assessment concluded the firm had to engage in strong technological upgrading in order 
to avoid obsolescence and being able to reach a “strong follower” position in the 
industry’s technological regime (PEMEX, 2001). As shown in figure 5.3.1, the firms has a 
less than favorable position in over 70% of the technologies assessed. 
Despite its booming level of sales during the late 1990’s, Pemex’s R&D investment 
efforts during the period 1997-1999 averaged barely 2.46% of total investment and 
0.533% of total sales (Pemex, 2001). 
 
{INSERT FIGURE 5.3.1 ABOUT HERE} 
 
Wind Energy 
The decision for installing a first grid-connected plant in Mexico arrived in 1993, 
almost ten years after the first mapping of economic exploitable resource. Lack of policy 
guidance, dis-articulation of efforts, and the strong presence of fossil fuel and 
hydroelectric power prevented resources from flowing to wind energy (Huacuz, 2005). 
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carried on as a turn-key plant, built-on-lease project. The opportunity of starting up a 
more locally integrated industry was thus lost, despite the existence of basic local 
technological capabilities at the IIE in engineering areas closely related to wind turbine 
technologies, and the availability of detected local manufacturers that could have 
provided components. IIE produced lab-level aerogenerators of 1-1.5 kWh that 
constituted the first steps in a potentially fruitful trajectory of technological learning.
8 
The project delivered very high plant operation factors (48% in the first two years of 
operation) at a cost of $0.04USD/kWh, very close to thermal electricity generation. The 
Electricity Company manages the plant after the lease, but privileging operation 
efficiency rather that learning. The plant is thus never really exploited as an 
experimentation site. 
For another ten years, wind energy remained unjustifiable to the CFE. In 2004 is 
launched the first large plant connected to the grid (La Venta II, a plant with 98 
generators of 850kWh, for a total 86 MW), under the same public bidding, turn-key plant 
scheme subcontracted to Gamesa and Iberinco (Borja-Díaz, et al. 2005). The deployment 
scheme that prevails form then on is one where foreign firms provide the generators, 
plant design and detailed engineering, while local firms participate in construction works. 
Only operational capabilities are being developed locally, following the established 
division of technological labor in which local firms work out the civil engineering parts 
of the projects, and foreign firms generate detail engineering and plant design. By 2008, 
scheduled investments under the same scheme are projected to provide additional 2,000 
MW of capacity for both direct generation and self-generation for manufacturing 
industries (CFE, 2007). 
 
Rural Electrification  
 
  Part of Mexico’s one step forward has been in terms of rural electrification, 
particularly in the case of photovoltaics and small-scale hydroelectric projects.  In  a 
relatively short period Mexico has been able to expand rural electrification to 90 percent 
of its population—much higher than most LAC nations.  In addition to expanding 
supply in a new cleaner energy source, Mexico has increased access to electricity for 
some of the most underprivileged members of its population.  Finally, Mexico has been 
able to leverage new public investment for renewable energy deployment in the rural 
sector.  
 
Mexico’s success is in part due to physical and socio-economic circumstances.  
Mexico is blessed with ample sunlight for solar power.  It also has a large rural 
population, much of which lives in poverty.  These two traits, coupled with the interests 
of numerous international institutions and organizations, has made Mexico a testing 
ground for renewable energy electrification as part of poverty reduction strategies.  As of 
2006, Mexico had almost 400 MW of installed capacity in solar PV and small-scale hydro, 
mostly located in rural areas. 
 
                                                 
8 Personal communication with Marco Borja, Project Leader of the Wind Energy from the Instituto de 
Investigaciones Eléctricas IIE, CFE’s major R&D provider. 
  23  Mexico started a rural electrification program, operated under the CFE in 1977, 
which floundered but was then rekindled in 1988.  In 1980 only twenty five percent of 
Mexico’s rural population had access to electricity.  By 2008 90 percent now have access. 
But Mexico is a large country, and 3.6 million rural inhabitants still lack electricity 
(Huacuz, 2005).  What’s more, those inhabitants dwell in remote areas where extending 
Mexico’s energy grid would be extremely costly.  Mexico is learning that rural PV 
applications become cost effective when juxtaposed against the costs of grid extension.  
To fund these efforts Mexico invested modest amounts of public investment but more 
importantly leveraged funds from international institutions.  The World Bank, Global 
Environmental Facility, United States Agency for International Development, Sandia 
National Laboratories have together contributed approximately $ 1 billion over the past 
fifteen years (CEC, 2006). 
 
  While the Mexican rural electrification case is a success in that it has increased 
supply of a cleaner energy source, from an innovation perspective it is not clear that 
Mexico will make collateral innovation or adaptations to the underlying technology.   
Indeed, the government and donors appear to be content with simply importing the 
technology.  Moreover, it is not clear how sustainable the external funding may be.   
Mexico will thus have to bolster investment to make sure there is still an incentive for 
international institutions to play a role there, and should focus collateral attention on 
developing capabilities to adapt to and improve upon imported technology. 
 
  
    
 
 
6.  Barriers and opportunities for ETI acceleration in IA 
To a very large extent, international differences in technological activities depend 
on the way in which an economic system faces and processes uncertainty, 
cumulativeness, and irreversibility (Patel and Pavitt, 1988).  In assessing barriers and 
opportunities for enhancing ETI it is therefore crucial to focus on the characteristics of 
the investment allocation processes that bound technological behavior. 
At one extreme, a system is myopic to the opportunities of a set of technological 
activities when it cannot help but evaluate them in an “ordinary” way; ordinary project 
evaluation would imply the assessment of benefits according to: a) normal rate of return, 
corresponding to b) an existing and defined market demand, and c) stringent discount 
rates for risk and time.
9 This type of project valuation biases against cumulative, 
irreversible and uncertain investment. At the other extreme, in dynamic systems project 
evaluation “also includes the prospect of creating new market demands, and of 
accumulating, over time, firm-specific knowledge that opens up further applications and 
opportunities” (see Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 1990, p. 102). 
In this section we argue that opportunities for enhance innovative behavior in 
ET’s depends crucially on macro-economic key variables, on the surrounding innovation 
system, and on the policy setup. 
                                                 
9 The argument resembles the notion of technological myopia by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969): the case 
where a firm technical choice is based “solely on current factor prices,” without taking “account of the 
value of the increase in knowledge associated with each technique” (op cit. p. 574). 
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Macro-economic instability has been a secular preoccupation in the region, which 
economic performance in the last decades has been characterized by a high degree of real 
economic volatility (Titelman, Pérez-Caldentey and Minzer, 2008) with strong impact on 
investment (Fanelli, 2008b). Macro-economic instability has as well affected negatively 
“financial development, the accumulation of human capital, the quality of institutions 
and the distribution of income” (Fanelli, 2008a). Clearly, the impossibility to establish the 
future movement of key macro-economic variables erodes the ability of the economic 
system to deal with long-term investment, irreversibility, risk and uncertainty. 
In the case of deployment of ET’s, where long-lived capital assets and long time 
horizons play a fundamental role in investment prospects, the cost of capital and the 
availability of credit is crucial. Secondly, and given its inherent uncertainty, innovative 
behavior highly sensitive to financing supply. Indeed, most innovation is so risky that it 
cannot simply be carried out through the traditional financing institutions, requiring 
venture capital or firm’s internal funds. Financial opening occurred during the late 1980’s 
and 1990’s did not translate into higher growth rates nor in a deeper financial penetration 
in the region; on the contrary, the opening of capital markets may have very likely 
contributed to a much more stringent environment by setting up high interest rates and 
overvalued exchange rates (Nadal, 2007). Venture capital schemes are practically un-
existent in the LA region. This, together with the overall dis-mantling of development 
banks (again, with the notable exception of Brazil), has set up a clearly adverse 
environment for engaging in generalized innovative behavior in LA. 
Even large energy companies, with larger enough assets to rely on international 
capital markets, seem to have suffered credit astringency, subjecting their investment 
range to safer technology bets with shorter payoff times, especially when they used to 
rely on government debt for expanding their activities (as was the case of Pemex and 
CFE; cfr. Islas and Rodríguez, 1997). 
Income constraints constitute definitively a barrier to ET’s diffusion and 
deployment, but this time acting on the demand side. In the crudest case, households 
and firms would prefer to adopt less efficient technologies that result cheaper in the 
shorter term simply due to high up-front costs. At the same time, both industrial as 
household consumers of energy will resist the increases in prices that would be 
demanded by new ET’s, reducing the policy space for introducing feed-in tariffs based 
on higher costs for consumers. 
6.2 Systemic capabilities and constraints 
As we stated above, innovation systems in LA tend to be dis-articulated, 
concentrated in basic research, with weak private involvement, and reduced to adaptive 
innovations. Several other constraints appear to play a role in shaping the landscape of 
technological opportunities related to ETI. 
A salient fact is the process of relative de-industrialization all over the region with 
exception of Brazil, Mexico and some Central American countries (Katz, 2005; ECLAC, 
2008, p. 73 and on). A closer look will show that even Mexico and Central American 
Countries have not really prevented de-industrialization, but rather occupied labor 
intensive niches within certain international production chains. Moreover, the reduction 
in the share of manufacturing in gross domestic product has been accompanied by a 
quality change, with a reduced orientation towards knowledge-intensive activities. As 
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undermine future growth capacity.” Finally, the share of engineering-, and science-based 
industries in manufacturing output is below the world average (ibid p. 74). These recent 
developments in the structural change profile of the region means that absorptive 
capacity in “surrounding” or complementary industrial technologies to ET’s is 
profoundly weak. 
There is thus strong evidence that LAC’s have advanced into a new round of 
primary specialization, in terms of their position in the international division of labor 
(Katz, 2005). In the medium term, this means that growth opportunities will induce 
stronger pressures to exploit energy sources (especially those with strong international 
demand), not in the direction of sustainable ETI but in that of technology outsourcing 
and export-oriented enclaves. It is important to note that a strong endowment of natural 
resources is not necessarily positive or negative for growth and development per se. It 
depends on how their exploitation is integrated (or not) into the broader economic 
system. ECLAC (2008) proposes some guidelines to neutralize negative effects and 
increase positive ones: a) macroeconomic policies to counter-act the cyclical fluctuations 
in world prices; b) promotion of domestic linkages, from production clusters to import 
substitution; c) accumulation of skills and “human capital” to develop knowledge 
intensive activities; d) create incentives to innovation, from R&D support, venture capital 
and strong financial support to new enterprises; e) strong development-oriented 
institutional coordination. 
Technology and innovation policy, finally, is only effective if it develops with a 
technology specific focus and in tandem with clearly defined industrial and energy 
policies. Attention to the different features of ETI Systems in every country, in 
consonance with the relative degree of local absorptive capacity must be carefully 
considered in policy design. Without specific strategies to build up system-specific 
absorptive capacities and secure a macro-environment that encourages long term 
planning, the energy future of the region will more likely depart from sustainable ETI 
and the more it will drift into technologically myopic, enclave-like regimes, driven by 
short-run maximization of rents. 
 
BOX: Innovation Policies: The Systemic Approach 
Linear models of innovation depicted it as a pipeline process: basic R&D, 
applied R&D, invention, marketing-testing, and diffusion imitation (see 
Rothwell, 1992). The normative derived from these models was that 
governments should invest massively in the first stage. Recent models of 
innovation focus on how each stage is linked to the next, paying 
particular attention to feedback loops and linkage effects within the chain 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1985; Soete and Arundel, 1993).  
Following this approach ETI is the outcome of a system made up of 
networks of firms, public and private organizations specialized in 
technological services, R&D labs, households, public institutions, 
standards. Following a systemic approach to innovation policy implies 
that policy responses for enhancing ETI must be: 
a) holistic: directed simultaneously to many interacting actors and rules 
  26b) sequential: proceed progressively for short, medium, and long term 
goals 
c) specific: depending on both country’s and technologies’ characteristics; 
and 
 d) adaptive: reviewed periodically to adjust to changing underlying 
conditions 
Additional sources: Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; Edquist, 1997 
  Finally, it is an open question as to whether the region’s “incumbent” innovators 
in state-owned oil industries will be resistant to change or become change agents.   
Traditionally, incumbents are more comfortable with their current focus on innovation 
and in the particular sectors with which they engage.  It can therefore be difficult for 
those same sectors to say, focus on something like wind power.  However, Brazil’s 
example offers some hope of another path.  As we previously highlighted, Petrobras not 
only has been a key innovator in terms of oil extraction but has also focused on bio-fuels 
and energy innovation in non fossil burning sectors. 
 
6.3 Policy space within international commitments 
Regardless of whether nations in Ibero-America choose to “make” or “buy” the 
necessary technologies that will be key for energy innovation in this century, some 21st 
century international trade, investment, and finance regimes make it more difficult to 
mimic some of the success stories discussed above.’ 
The ETI standout in this study is of course Brazil.  Brazil’s capabilities have been 
built up over years of dedicated experimentation and guidance on the part of the 
government and the state-owned energy giant, Petrobras.  Many of the policies that 
Brazil has deployed to build capabilities in such activities as ultra-deep water drilling and 
biofuels are simply not permitted under the WTO and more so under Preferential Trade 
Agreements with many other developed nations, particularly those with the United 
States.  Any effort to single out a specific sector, and worse a domestic firm in a specific 
sector, are in fundamental violation of the principle of “national treatment.”  National 
treatment means that no domestic industry or firm can be treated more favorably than a 
foreign sector.  What’s more, as is shown in Table 6.1, many other aspects of trade 
agreements run up the abilities of countries to deploy key policies for industrial learning.  
And preferential trade agreements such as NAFTA offer even more limited space than 
the WTO. 
{INSERT TABLE 6.1 ABOUT HERE} 
 
As the table shows, requiring that foreign firms or patent holders transfer certain 
technologies or that such entities locate R&D facilities and train local personnel is now 
forbidden under investment and intellectual property provisions respectively—though 
not actionable under the WTO.  In the table an “X” indicates that the policy is not 
permitted, a “.” indicates that the policy is under consideration for elimination under 
current negotiations.  Subsidizing learning is strictly forbidden under treaties such as 
NAFTA and DR_CAFTA.  However, there is significantly more “policy space” under 
  27the WTO.  This is good news for Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and a small number of 
other countries in the region who have yet to sign PTAs with the US.   For countries that 
do have such treaties, they have to “buy” technologies at monopoly and oligopoly prices 
(K.P. Gallagher, 2005; K.P. Gallagher, 2008). 
 
8.  Summary and Conclusions  
 
This Background Paper reviewed the state of energy technology innovation 
(ETI) capabilities in Ibero-America (IA) and examines the barriers and opportunities for 
upgrading and diversifying those capabilities.  We identified four factors that drive new 
ETI: the fuel mix of both the regional and the world demand will continue to change, 
catalyzing new energy security issues; expanding access to improved energy services is 
needed to improve income inequality (Latin America is the most unequal region in the 
world) as well as rural conditions and human health. More than a focused, poverty-
reducing policy, expansion of access to energy is a development policy in its own right 
with strong impacts in social development and economic security; developing countries 
cannot replicate the emission-intensive path of industrial economies; and new energy 
technologies constitute an emerging wave of generic technologies and expanding 
markets. This “development wave” will offer technological and economic benefits for 
countries that develop suitable entry and catching-up strategies, and a missed opportunity 
for those who don’t.  Ibero-American nations are poised to capitalize on this 
opportunity. 
First we provided a framework for ETI and economic development and then 
provided a snapshot of energy use and consumption in the region.  With the exception 
of a handful of countries (Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Peru and some others), the region 
has fairly secure sources of energy for some time to come.  We also identify that this 
“cushion” can be a catalyst or a crutch.  That depends on the policy environment and the 
ETI system in each nation. 
  Second we outlined the contours of ETI systems in the region. We find that 
there is a vast difference in the levels of ETI capabilities across Ibero-America.  Brazil, 
Spain being among the leaders, Central American and Andean nations among the 
laggards, and nations like Mexico somewhere in the middle.  Third we conduct an 
assessment of ETI capabilities in the region, creating a database or energy research 
deployment and development.  From these data we learn that energy RD&D is fairly 
abysmal across Ibero-America—with most nations spending on the order of one percent 
of total RD&D on energy RD&D.  That is one percent of a very small amount of total 
innovation spending, which is less than 1 percent of GDP in LAC. 
  We then provide illustrative examples of some of the leaders and laggards in ETI 
in Ibero America.  We focus on Brazil’s ETI capabilities in terms of ultra-deep water 
drilling and in biofuels.  We also point out the import role of clustering and long-run 
financing has taken in Brazil.  We then turn to a discussion of Spain’s wind energy 
achievements in recent years, and Mexico’s perils in terms of oil innovation but promise 
in terms of rural electrification.  The final section discusses the opportunities and barriers 
for energy innovation in Ibero-America in decades to come. 
 
  28Need for more research 
  This background paper is far from the last word on this subject.  Its intent it to 
provide an over-arching framework and empirical context from which more research 
needs to be done.  Indeed, each of the different sub-sections of this paper could be a 
short study in and of itself: a thorough analysis of energy profiles and projections of 
future demand; in depth case studies of ETI systems and RD&D in the region; 
combined with full fledged case studies of Spain, Brazil, and Mexico.  Alas, this was 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
  In addition to giving full attention to these sub-topics however, two items were 
not given ample attention and need further work.  First is innovation in the capital goods 
sector that reduces energy use and signals switches to cleaner technology.  According to 
Poveda (2007), Latin America has a low average energy intensity (below the world 
average), but has seized very few opportunities to reduce it in the last decades. Energy 
efficiency in Latin America would had advanced at an annual rate of 0.2% between 1990 
and 2005, a lower rate than, for example, that of the European Union in the same period 
(0.9%). While Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru have well developed energy 
efficiency programs, the rest of the region has failed in develop suitable institutions. 
Mexico shows the strongest advance in national energy efficiency in the region, although 
other studies have shown that this outcome has an important de-industrialization 
component (Aguayo and Gallagher, 2005).  
  A second area of significant research that is needed on is rural energy use and the 
energy-wellbeing nexus.  Latin America is home to millions of rural inhabitants with little 
or no access to energy.  What is the state of energy use in these regions and to what 
extent can policies be devised that expand access to poor rural populations, and helps 
poor people use access to energy as a source of productive capabilities? 
 
Lessons for Policy 
  The findings in this paper have three very important lessons for policy.  First, 
Ibero-America needs to seize and seek the opportunities that the new energy 
environment that it faces.  Whether it be wind or solar power, ultra-deep water drilling, 
or biofuels, the region is blessed with the potential of ample new sources of energy, old 
and new.  But rich endowments will turn into a curse if innovation capabilities are not 
developed.  Second and importantly, nations in Ibero-America need to set the right 
policy environment so that production and consumption of new energy sources happens 
at all and does so in a way that spurs economic growth and equality with as little an 
environmental footprint as possible.  That policy environment is putting in place the 
elements of a national ETI system.  This leads to the third and final point, that ETI in 
Ibero-America will need significant and sustained levels of public investment and 
coordination.  Externalities in the global market place, as well as the macro-economic, 
lock-in, and other limitations of ETI in the region make it all to clear that markets will 
not drive Ibero-American nations into a clean energy future.  Long-run and sustained 
financing is essential, as witnessed by our discussion of BNDES in Brazil. Moreover, 
policies at the macroeconomic, finance, and innovation system levels need to be aligned 
and consistent, following a long-term perspective. Developing local technological 
capacity is the only way the region can manage an energy transition that fulfills the 
principles of sustainable ETI. 
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Oil Dependence in Latin America 
                 
                 
   1965 1975 1985 1995 2007
   (national production/consumption)
                 
Mexico  1.27 1.26 2.52 2.06  1.94 
Argentina  0.63 0.92 1.27 1.92  1.48 
Brazil  0.32 0.20 0.50 0.47  0.94 
Colombia  3.01 1.25 1.18 2.50  2.68 
Ecuador  0.62 5.43 3.54 3.98  3.25 
Peru  0.90 0.62 1.64 0.84  0.76 
Venezuela  19.66 10.31 5.25 7.63  5.00 
                 
Total Latin America  2.49 1.39 1.59 1.62  1.48 
                 
Source: BP Statistical Review, 2008          
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Figure 3.1 




















































































































Proven Reserves of Oil in Latin America 
          




Tonnes    
Thousand 
Million Tonnes Share of LAC total 
R/P 
ratio
          
Mexico 53.0   11.9 9.6%  10.3
Argentina 2.3   2.6 2.1%  10.5
Brazil 2.8   12.6 10.3%  18.2
Colombia 2.1   1.4 1.1%  6.0
Ecuador 1.5   3.8 3.1%  20.3
Peru 0.9   1.1 0.9%  25.5
Trinidad & Tobago  0.6   0.8 0.7%  15.2
Venezuela 58.5   99.4 80.7%  *
Other S. & Cent. America  0.6   1.4 1.1%  27.7
Total LAC  69.2   123.2   50.3
          
Source: BP Statistical Review, 2009         
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  35Table 3.1 
Reference Scenario: Energy in Latin America 2000-2030 
   Investment  Capacity 
Growth 







2030  2000-2030 
   (billion USD)  (average annual 
growth) 
Oil  91 112 133 336 0.0
Exploration and development  70 81 90 241 
Non-conventional oil  15 17 27 59 
Refining  61 41 73 7     
Gas  54 78 115 247  1,852.8
Exploration and development  28 45 68 141 
LNG liquefaction  7 3 4 15 
LNG regasification  ----  
Transmission 10 16 23 49 
Distribution 9 12 19 39 
Undergroud storage  0112     
Coal  334 1 0   2,271.9
T o t a l  m i n i n g   3339  
    New mining  capacity  2226  
    Sustaining mining capacity  1113  
P o r t s  0011  
Electricity  191 247 306 744    
Generating capacity  86 111 120 317  2,723.4
     Renewables  63 78 69 211  3,262.9
     Renewables as % of Generating Capacity  73.3 70.3 57.5 67 
Refurbishment 5 6 8 19 
Transmission 32 41 55 128 
Distribution 69 89 124 281 
Total Regional investment  339 440 558 1337 
as % of GDP  1.65 1.59 1.50 1.53 
          
Per Capita GDP Annual Growth  1.6 1.9 2.0      
Source: Authors' calculations based on World Energy Investment Outlook 2003 
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 Table 5.1 
R&D Expenditure in Energy* 
millions 2005 $US 
   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Argentina
1
             67.0 84.4 69.1  78.8 59.6 25.8 38.7 12.0 15.7 14.8 20.2 29.2 
Brasil
2
             376.2        393.3 338.2 267.8 289.5 366.1 513.6 615.8 675.4 
Chile  16.3  17.4 25.7 23.8 24.0 27.1 27.9 25.1 30.2  23.5 15.6 12.6             
Ecuador             0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1      0.1 0.1 0.1     1.7   
El Salvador                   0.09                    
Guatemala                                  0.1     
México
3
0.0  0.0 0.0 160.0 102.1 78.4 117.1 438.0 276.9  183.3 202.5 177.1 204.4 183.5 123.3 117.5     
Panamá       0.3                0.7 1.0 0.1 0.0 2.5 2.4     
Paraguay                            0.012 0.010 0.013 0.003     
Uruguay  5.9  0.0 0.1 8.1 8.1 3.5 5.9 14.4 0.4  0.1 0.1   0.1       0.6   
Portugal                 11.9    10.0   20.6   16.5   21.5     
Spain
4
155.2  238.5 216.7 206.7 208.3 261.5 184.7 213.1 177.2  164.8 143.3 175.8 180.1 243.9 178.8 58.5     
Latin America  22.2  17.4 26.1 191.9 134.1 109.2 594.3 574.0 376.8  295.7 671.8 575.4 511.3 501.7 507.6 670.0 638.2 704.6 
Ibero America  177.4  256.0 242.9 398.6 342.4 370.7 779.0 787.1 554.1  460.4 815.1 751.2 691.4 745.6 686.5 728.5 638.2 704.6 
Source: Inter-American Network on Science and Technology Indicators (RICYT), except when indicated. Exchange rates from International Financial Statistics, 
IMF. 
* All figures are public R&D, except when indicated. Blank cells are undetermined data. 
1 Public R&D expenditure, from Science and Technology Indicators (several years), Ministry of Science and Technology of Argentina. 
2 2000-2007 figures include both Public and Firm Energy R&D Expenditures. Public R&D expenditure from Sistema Integrado de Administração Financeira do 
Governo Federal (Siafi). Firm  R&D investment corresponds to R&D in the production of coke, oil refining, nuclear fuels and alcohol production, from Pesquisa 
Industrial de Inovação Tecnológica (Pintec) 2000 do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Firm R&D for years 2001, 2002, and 2004 are 
averaged from 2000, 2003, and 2005 point observations; 2006 and 2007 firm R&D was projected from the 2000-05 annual growth rate and added to public R&D 
expenditure. 3 1995 -2005 figures from CONACYT. Includes the total budget of three major public energy R&D Institutes (Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Eléctricas, and Instituto de Investigaciones Nucleares), as well as Pemex's R&D expenditure. Source: Indicadores de Ciencia yTecnología 2005, 
Science and Technology Council (CONACYT), Mexico. 
4 Includes Public and Firm Energy R&D Expenditures, from International Energy Agency and OECD, EAS (ANBERD database), June 2006, respectively. 
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 Figure 5.3 
Production of New Renewable Electricity Sources, 2006
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  44Table 5.3 
 
World NRES for Electricity Production, 2006 
   Wind Geothermal  Solar, Wave, 
Fuel Cells  Biomass 
   (billion KWh)    
North 
America           28.96  14.57 0.66 77.35 
Latin America             0.67  8.87 0.01 24.39 
Europe           78.55  7.92 5.69 93.01 
Eurasia             0.17  0.44 0.00 2.72 
Middle East             0.13  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Africa             0.83  0.86 0.00 0.61 
Asia & 
Oceania           15.62  22.42 0.23 31.41 
World 
        
124.93   55.07 6.59 229.49 
Growth rate*  26.9 1.8 13.5 6.3 
* Corresponds to the technology's production average annual growth rate in the 
world during 2000-2006. 





BNDES Financing of Energy Development and Innovation 
              
  2006 2007 2008 2009
  (R$ million )
              
Oil & Gas  4,481.6 4,091.4 4,807.6  4,380.3
Ethanol  446.7 1,661.0 3,079.6  1,212.1
Electricity Generation  2,125.4 2,910.4 6,545.4  9,262.5
Cogeneration 276.3 134.0 858.8  217.7
Hydroelectricity 1,303.9 2,416.7 5,207.0  8,938.6
Thermoelectricity 5.7 179.2 28.4  4.5
Solar-Wind etc. 382.2 67.0 229.0  10.0
Indirect financing 157.2 113.5 222.2  91.8
Electricity - Transmission  379.2 2,431.4 698.3  364.9
              
Electricity - Distribution  673.3 1,033.8 1,378.8  1,152.1
              
FUNTEC  2.8 20.6 60.6  63.3
              
Total  8,108.8 12,148.7 16,570.2  16,435.3
              
Source: BNDES, 2009             
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